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Introduction
The advent and proliferation of Voting Advice (or Aid) Applications (VAAs),
which offer voting advice on the basis of calculating the ideological congruence
between citizens and political actors, have resulted to the proliferation of
numerous estimates of the positions of political parties in several different
electoral contexts (local, regional, national and supranational) across Europe.
The proliferation of these data has effectively enabled political scientists to
put many empirical questions under rigorous tests. In particular, researchers
investigated whether VAAs influence voting behaviour (Marschall and
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Schmidt, 2008; Walgrave et al, 2008; Garzia, 2010), participation and voter
turnout (Fivaz and Nadig, 2010; Hartwig, 2010; Ladner and Pianzola, 2010),
and have used VAA data to test questions relating to voting behaviour, pledge
fulfilment, policy congruence and the dimensionality of political space
(Schwarz et al, 2011; Talonen and Sulkava, 2011; Katsanidou and Lefkofridi,
forthcoming; Wheatley et al, 2012).
Although much has been written about the effects of VAAs, little is known
about how VAAs estimate the position of political parties and political actors,
in general. Many of the empirical applications assume that the VAA data on
parties’ positions are uncontroversial and do not examine their validity and
reliability. In this sense, many third-party users consider the VAA data as
‘given’ or at least collected through some objective process. In particular,
researchers have devised numerous methods of doing so, which include survey-
based approaches, the analysis or roll-call voting and the analysis of political
text. Each of these approaches uses different data sources and makes different
implicit or explicit assumptions regarding the dimensionality of political space,
whereas some methods are considered to be more suitable than others
depending on the political context and the particular research question. These
differences notwithstanding, there is no apparent consensus regarding the
validity and reliability of party position estimates when alternative methods are
compared with one another (Volkens, 2007; Dinas and Gemenis, 2010).
Most VAAs follow an alternative to the aforementioned approaches that is
based on the construction of Likert scales and, with respect to data collection,
includes elements from content analysis. This is, in many respects, an
innovative approach that has a lot of potential; however, as this article argues,
we need to consider many methodologically controversial aspects of the
estimation process in the context of VAAs. Nevertheless, failure to do so can
result in a proliferation of unreliable and invalid data on party positions with
potential consequences, not only to the accuracy of our inferences about how
democracy works but also to the democratic process itself (see Walgrave et al,
2009; Ramonait
.
e, 2010). In the following section, I outline the most common
features of the VAA approach to estimating parties’ positions, while specific
aspects of this approach are examined critically in the respective sections. To
reinforce the constructive aspect of this article, the concluding section offers
some suggestions to VAA designers regarding improving the validity and
reliability of party position estimates in the context of VAAs.
How VAAs Position Political Parties
With the exception of a few instances where the positions of political actors are
based on estimates from previously conducted expert surveys (see Wall et al, 2009)
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or roll-call voting records (see Sˇkop, 2010), most VAAs have adopted the
summated rating scale approach to measurement, even though this is not
always mentioned explicitly in the VAA websites. In essence, most VAAs use
the approach developed by Rensis Likert for psychological attitude measure-
ment in the early 1930s. According to Likert (1932), the measurement of
attitudes can be achieved through measuring responses on individual items that
are representative of the attitude in question. Each item, as proposed by Likert,
consists of a stem statement and a response key, which indicates the
respondent’s attitude towards the stem statement. When these items are
combined, the resulting measure is a Likert scale. The idea behind Likert scales
is that each individual item by itself is an imperfect indicator of the latent
concept (in this case, party policy or ideology). Likert scales aim to fully
capture the latent concept by combining responses from multiple items.
The advantage of simplicity and ease of use has established Likert scales as
the prima facie technique for psychological attitude measurement. Never-
theless, with some exceptions (Pellikaan et al, 2003; Kriesi et al, 2006; Gemenis
and Dinas, 2010), until the proliferation of VAAs, the use of Likert scales in
measuring parties’ positions was limited. Most expert, elite and mass surveys
ask respondents to place parties directly on interval scales, which represent the
latent dimensions of interest. Moreover, the assumption that political actors
are able to take explicit in favour, against or neutral positions on political
issues sets the Likert scaling approach apart from the approaches such as
the Comparative Manifestos Project (Budge, 2001) and Wordscores (Laver
et al, 2003), which attempt to estimate positions on the basis of the relative
occurrence of certain type of words or quasi-sentences in political text. It
should be rather evident that the relative emphasis political parties place on
certain words or quasi-sentences associated with particular issues may or may
not reveal their positions on these issues (Laver, 2001). Words or quasi-
sentence frequencies can be a useful way to measure issue salience but can be
problematic in the context of measuring positions (Lowe, 2008; Dinas and
Gemenis, 2010). Conversely, Likert scales are concerned with measuring
positions, but cannot measure the salience or the importance that parties attach
to the issues in question.
However, as Walgrave et al (2009, pp. 1161–1162) noted, VAAs differ with
regard to their assumptions on the dimensionality of political space and on
how issue statements and policy positions are determined, weighted and
presented. Nevertheless, in contrast to the approach of estimating the positions
of political actors on the latent (and unobservable) ideological dimension of
interest directly, most VAAs use the logic of Likert scaling. VAAs position
political actors on a number of issues (Likert items) that can be considered to
be partial and imperfect indicators of the latent dimension(s) and subsequently
average positions across issues in order to achieve a positional estimate on the
Parties’ positions in VAAs
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latent ideological dimension(s) (Likert scales). In addition, VAAs use the same
items and scales to position political actors and voters, and therefore are in
a position to claim that they are able to ‘advice’ voters as to which party or
candidate lies closer to their views.
The advantages of the Likert scale compared with survey approaches and the
salience-based content analysis notwithstanding, it should be stressed that no
method of estimating the positions of political actors should be viewed as
uncontroversial. Likert scales are quite straightforward to design but are often
misused. To this view, this article critically reviews three aspects in the use of
Likert scales by VAAs and examines whether the party positions given by
VAAs can be considered to be valid and reliable. First, the article considers
issues regarding the phrasing of stem statements and the selection of response
keys. Second, as it is not always feasible (or advisable) for researchers to ask
political parties to position themselves, researchers need to code the actors’
policy statements into the response keys. The article therefore explores the
issue of intercoder reliability. Finally, the article explores the practice of
constructing Likert scales on the basis of Likert items in the context of VAAs.
The following sections explore these three aspects by using the data primarily
from ‘EU Profiler’, a cross-national VAA used for the 2009 elections to the
European Parliament (EP).
Stem Statement and Response Key Issues
One of the first things to consider when designing a VAA (or any type of
survey for that matter) is making sure that the question wording and answer
format have been used appropriately and in a consistent manner. Likert scales
are no exception as Likert items feature stem statements akin to survey
questions and response keys in varying formats (Johns, 2010, p. 3). Textbooks
on asking survey questions have long advised against the use of the so-called
double-barrelled questions (Oppenheim, 1992, pp. 126–128; Spector, 1992,
pp. 23–24; Bradburn et al, 2004, pp.142–144; DeVellis, 2011, pp.82–83), that is,
questions that ask for opinion on two different things. Despite this advice,
VAAs often use double-barrelled questions in their stem statements. Con-
sider the following statement found in ‘Help Me Vote’ VAA in Greece: ‘The
electoral system must be changed and single-member constituencies should be
established in order to strengthen the relationship between citizens and MPs
and eliminate the need for “campaign spending”’. This statement contains at
least two questions: (a) whether the respondent feels that the electoral system
should change, and (b) whether single-member constituencies should be
established. It is rather obvious that a candidate, party or voter may agree with
(a) but disagree with (b), perhaps because the latter is most often than not
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associated with non-proportional electoral systems. Moreover, it is not clear
whether (c) strengthening the relationship between citizens and MPs, and
(d) eliminating the need for ‘campaign spending’ are always a consequence of
(a) and (b). A candidate, party or voter might feel that there might be a need
for (c) but not for (d); think that (a) is good for (c) but not for (d); think that
(b) is good for (d) but not for (a) and so on.
Although the mentioned example from ‘Help Me Vote’ is rather unfortunate,
it is quite easy for double-barrelled questions to slip in VAA stem statements.
Consider the statements in the most prominent VAA, the EU Profiler. As shown
in Table 1, EU Profiler includes many double-barrelled statements, even though
this VAA has been designed by using the expertise of a large team of experienced
researchers. The problem of double-barrelled questions seems to be stemming
from two different problems. First, when formulating questions in VAAs, many
designers feel the need to present policy alternatives in terms of trade-offs. This is
a legitimate concern when asking questions about spending preferences, because
asking questions that are not framed in terms of trade-offs has been shown to
elicit inconsistent responses where ‘majorities wish to spend more money on just
about everything’ (Hansen, 1998, p. 514). This implies that although the EU
Profiler double-barrelled statements 1 and 11 may be accepted on the basis of the
need to ask a single question about two different things in order to outline the
trade-off that would lead to consistent responses about people’s (and parties)
fiscal attitudes, the inclusion of other double-barrelled questions (such as
statement 4 on immigration/economic growth) cannot be sustained on similar
methodological grounds.
Double-barrelled questions may also arise from the designers’ need of
researchers to adapt the VAA statements to very specific electoral contexts.
This is shown in Appendix A that contains a non-exhaustive list of recent
Table 1: Double-barrelled stem statements in the EU Profiler
Item Stem statement
1 Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes.
4 Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be encouraged as a means of
fostering economic growth.
11 Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes.
14 Governments should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order to fight unemployment.
16 Renewable sources of energy (eg., solar or wind energy) should be supported even if this
means higher energy costs.
17 The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes (eg., road taxing).
18 Policies to fight global warming should be encouraged even if it hampers economic growth or
employment.
Note: The elements of double-barrelled statements are in italics.
Parties’ positions in VAAs
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examples from VAAs in countries such as Austria, The Netherlands, Switzerland
and the United Kingdom. Apparently, the debate in the United Kingdom
regarding the spending cuts evolved around different questions: whether the
budget deficit should be halved (or reduced by another fraction); whether this
should be done by means of cuts in public spending (or increasing taxes);
whether this should be done within 4 years (or a longer period); and whether
the cuts should be equally distributed among the different government depart-
ments (or distributed unequally). Researchers may feel the urge to compress as
much information within a single VAA statement in order to present the ‘whole
debate’, but this urge should be resisted. As advised in all the classic survey
design textbooks, researchers can opt for transforming the double-barrelled
questions in two (or more) separate questions. In the Vote Match example,
researchers could have separated the two double-barrelled questions into four
different statements.
Similar to double-barrelled questions and statements that introduce a
certain qualification (Bradburn et al, 2004, pp. 144–145) can stem from
the researchers’ need to define the context of the debate. Consider the fol-
lowing statement in 2008 Wahlkabine: ‘should important decisions taken
at the EU level (such as Turkey’s accession, reform treaty y) be subject
to a referendum in Austria, even if such a referendum is not held across the
EU?’ Apparently, the VAA designers entered ‘Turkey’s accession’ as an
example to aid respondents (and expert coders of party positions) in defining
‘important decisions’. By doing so, however, they introduced a qualifi-
cation that transformed the statement into a which could lead respondents
(and coders) towards a specific response. In the particular example, this implies
that responses to the particular question (arguably about attitudes towards
European integration) could be contaminated by attitudes regarding Turkey’s
accession.
The presence of ‘quantitative statements’ is also something that could be
avoided in Likert item stem statements (Johns, 2010, p. 4), but several such
statements can be found in VAAs. Appendix A gives some examples from some
recent VAAs. For instance, ‘criminals should be punished more severely’
(statement 20 in EU Profiler) is a good example of a quantitative statement.
The ‘more’ qualification reveals that the statement is implicitly trying to
measure some sort of quantity. Does the respondent who disagrees with the
statements about criminals being punished more severely think that criminals
should be punished less severely or as severely as they are currently punished?
As Johns (2010, p. 4) put it, ‘the key point is that Likert items are intended
to capture the extent of agreement or disagreement with an idea, and not
to measure some sort of quantity or “hidden variable”’. The problem is that,
by making a quantitative statement, researchers superimpose a dimension
suggested by the stem (‘more’/‘less’) over the dimension suggested by the
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response key (‘agree’/‘disagree’). This violates the equivalence between the
response dimension and the underlying dimension (Krosnick and Presser, 2010,
p. 278) and ‘measurement is contaminated by the existence of multiple
dimensions’ (Hodge and Gillespie, 2004, p. 56). Moreover, the use of quan-
titative statements requires increased cognitive effort from the part of the
respondent or the researcher who will be engaged in coding actor’s positions
(Krosnick and Presser, 2010, pp. 265–266).
Stem statements that are too general do not make very good Likert scale
items either. As outlined in the previous section, the measurement theory
behind Likert scales assumes that the statements used for constructing the scale
are imperfect indicators of a latent unobservable dimension. Therefore, stem
statements should be selected within this context. The items within a summated
rating scale should measure attitudes on different aspects of the latent
dimension and not measure attitudes directly on the latent dimension by using
general encompassing statements. If the goal was to capture attitudes using
a single question, researchers would use interval level scales, such as the ones
used in expert, elite and mass surveys and not binary or ordinal response keys.
This means that although ‘European integration is a good thing’ (statement 23
in EU Profiler stem) is appropriate in the context of expert, elite and mass
surveys as it purports to measure the latent dimension directly, it is not appro-
priate in the context of a Likert scale. The fact that such general statements can
capture a great deal of the latent dimension is shown in Table 2, where I cor-
relate each of the items of the EU Profiler European integration scale against
an encompassing measure that can be considered to be indicative of the latent
dimension (expert survey estimates from Hooghe et al, 2010). It turns out that
the item associated with the most specific stem statement (12) has the smallest
correlation coefficient, whereas the most general (23) has the largest, almost as
large as the encompassing scale, which includes all items in Table 2. In effect,
Table 2: Correlations between expert survey estimates and EU Profiler items
Item Statement r n
12 The EU should acquire its own tax-raising powers. 0.361 111
21 On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU should
speak with one voice.
0.703 132
22 The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy. 0.743 131
23 European integration is a good thing. 0.809 140
24 [Country] is much better off in the EU than outside it. 0.774 139
26 The European Parliament should be given more powers. 0.552 123
27 Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power. 0.762 113
Scale 0.833 143
Note: Pearson’s product–moment correlation coefficients with Po0.001.
Parties’ positions in VAAs
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using statements that are too specific in conjunction with statements that are
too general works against the idea of a Likert scale in which the same weight is
attached to each and every item in the scale.
Considering the response keys of Likert items, I examine three issues. The
number of options in the response key, whether neutral midpoints are offered
and whether reference points are available. The response keys in EU Profiler and
other VAAs in the Kieskompas family are the classic 5-point Likert items with a
neutral midpoint, whereas the StemWijzer family of VAAs features response
keys with agree/disagree and ‘no opinion’ options. Likert originally suggested
using 5-point response scales as it would be difficult to position an actor who
might only be moderately against or in favour of a particular statement
(Krosnick and Presser, 2010, p. 269). As the task of the respondents becomes
easier when labels are used on the response key options (Krosnick and Presser,
2010, p. 271), the classic labelling in 5-point response keys follows variations
along the ‘completely disagree/tend to agree/neutral/tend to agree/completely
agree’ pattern of responses. However, such labelling confounds direction (agree/
disagree) with intensity (completely/tend to) by asking respondents (and coders)
to think along multiple dimensions, which can lead to measurement contamina-
tion (Hodge and Gillespie, 2004, pp. 56–57), especially when the response key is
associated with a ‘quantitative statement’ as argued above. Although 5-point
scales may outperform 3-point response keys on some aspects (Kleinnijenhuis
and Krouwel, 2008), research has shown that the direction/intensity confounding
occurs fairly often in Likert items (Duncan and Stenbeck, 1987). In addition, if
5-point response keys offer more choices, 3-point response keys might be
preferable in terms of intercoder reliability (see below). This means that the
choice between few or more response choices is essentially a trade-off between
validity and reliability (Krosnick and Presser, 2010, pp. 272–273), although it is
not entirely clear whether the response keys in VAAs are selected on the basis of
such considerations or simply conform to the format of the ‘parent’ VAA.
Turning to whether a response scale midpoint is offered, there seems to
be a near consensus, as nearly all VAAs feature a neutral midpoint (‘neither
agree/disagree’, ‘neutral’ or ‘open-minded’). Much research has shown that
offering midpoints can be advantageous in terms of validity and reliability
(Krosnick and Presser, 2010, p. 274). Nevertheless, research has also shown
that the midpoint is often used by respondents as a ‘don’t know’ option or ‘as
a safe haven by a “silent minority”, taking refuge in that option rather than
confessing to an unpopular viewpoint’ (Johns, 2005, p. 237). This problem is
particularly acute when parties attempt to manipulate their placement in order
to gain more voting recommendations (see below). For such reasons, it is
advisable to offer a neutral midpoint only in statements associated with less
prominent issues where parties are expected to take a neutral position (Johns,
2005).
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A related problem is the averaging of items in Likert scales that makes
non-response indistinguishable from truly neutral positions. The EU Profiler
follows the practice of combining the Likert items to scales by averaging, but
research has highlighted the problems associated with this approach (Gemenis
and Dinas, 2010, pp. 184–185). Monte Carlo simulations showed that replacing
missing values by the response key midpoint should be used only when ‘there is
consistency in scores for an item across observations’ (McDonald et al, 2000,
p. 89). Such consistency should not be assumed when units are political parties,
which represent varied response combinations, and therefore it is advisable to
calculate parties’ positions using scales where missing values are excluded
rather than imputed (cf. Gemenis and Dinas, 2010, p. 194).
Finally, we need to consider whether response scales offer a reference point
for the status quo. Pellikaan et al (2003, p. 34) have argued that the placement
of parties by using Likert scales should be made in relationship to a reference
point indicating the status quo. None of the most prominent VAAs, however,
has used such reference points explicitly, although sometimes stem statements
include some contextual information. Respondents in surveys have been shown
to rely on informational cues (Krosnick, 1991) and Gschwend and Proksch
(2010) found that indicating the status quo in the response key significantly
reduced item non-response, changed respondents’ self-placement, changed
respondents’ placement of political parties and changed the perception of
ideological distance between voters and their preferred parties. To the extent that
the measurement of parties’ positions depends on the coding of various sources
by a group of experts (see below), the inclusion of the status quo can serve as an
additional piece of information, which may generate more variation in party
positions that is otherwise possible (Gschwend and Proksch, 2010, p. 2).
Coding Reliability Issues
Notwithstanding the few VAAs that use expert surveys or roll-call voting
records, most VAAs estimate the policy positions of parties on the basis of
expert coding of party manifestos and other publicly available statements, on
the basis of elite surveys using responses provided by the parties or through a
combination of the latter two approaches. The advantage of elite surveys (that is,
asking parties to self-placements) is that parties are positioned by using the same
procedure that applies to voters. Simple and desirable as this might sound, there
are several problems with this approach. First, there are many parties and
candidates who refuse to position themselves either because they are uninterested
in VAAs or because they do not agree with the way the questions are phrased
(Trechsel and Mair, 2011, pp. 13–16; Nezi et al, 2010, p. 81). This is not new, of
course, as elite surveys have been traditionally plagued by low response rates. In
Parties’ positions in VAAs
9r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica 1–28
such cases, researchers have no other solution than place the parties on the
basis of political text (manifestos, press releases, green/white papers, statements
in websites, speeches, parliamentary debates, interviews and so on).
Second, as VAAs are becoming increasingly popular, political parties have
incentives to manipulate their stated positions in order to present an image that
will be appealing to voters (Wagner and Ruusuvirta, 2012, p. 406). Politicians
may wish to duck some controversial issues, or appear as moderate and centrist,
even if they are generally considered to have extreme views. Evidence from the
Lithuanian Mano Balsas revealed that the VAA was strategically manipulated
and the voting recommendations gave an advantage to non-programmatic
parties (Ramonait
.
e, 2010). A new party that was not constrained by a detailed
electoral programme seems to have instructed its candidates to answer the VAA
questions in a specific way in order to attain the inconsistent, but yet very
popular among voters’ placement indicating support towards the increase of
social services and reduction of taxes (Ramonait
.
e, 2010, pp. 134–135). Of course,
researchers are well aware of this possibility. When the EU Profiler country
teams asked national parties to complete the VAA questionnaire, many parties
adopted positions which came in conict with what VAA researchers thought to
be their ‘true’ positions, on the basis of their public statements. Political parties
that expected to earn votes through VAAs cooperated with the researchers,
whereas those that did not expect any gains threatened with legal action (Trechsel
and Mair, 2011, pp. 13–15). These anecdotal findings are rather illustrative of
what could happen if we let political parties position themselves at will.
The alternative approach of positioning parties on the basis of political text
is bound with problems of coding reliability (Groot, 2003, pp. 23–24).
Essentially, for each item in a VAA, expert coders are asked to do two different
things: (a) locate the party manifesto, or some statement that presents the
party’s position, and (b) use it to code each stem statement on a 3- or 5-point
response key. In turn, both steps can introduce unreliability in the coding of
parties’ positions. It is well known that many parties do not publish manifestos
(Gemenis, 2012), whereas some parties do not have very clearly stated positions
on all issues that are included in VAAs. Therefore, party position estimates in
VAAs are partially dependent on how ‘deep’ researchers are willing to search in
order to find some evidence, which can be used for coding. EU Profiler has
issued a coding manual that outlined the ‘hierarchy of documents’ that can be
used for coding. However, in the absence of documents at the top, expert
coders are left to decide themselves about how much further in the hierarchy
of documents to go. Moreover, interviews and statements made during
parliamentary debate appear at the bottom of the hierarchy, but it is still
questionable whether such evidence can be considered as representative under
the party as a unitary actor assumption (Gemenis, 2012). Equally controversial
is using evidence from legislative voting in order to gauge parties’ positions, as
Gemenis
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it is well established that voting patterns often reflect party discipline and
government–opposition dynamics, which implies that roll-calls cannot always
be considered as parties’ ideal point estimates (Spirling and McLean, 2007).
Apart from variability in the coding sources, the double-barrelled or vague
wording of some of the stem statements in VAAs leaves open the possibility for
alternative interpretations regarding the coding of text into the categories of
the response key. Again, consider item 23 in EU Profiler: ‘European
integration is a good thing’. It is rather obvious that any positive statement
towards the EU can be used to code a party as agreeing or completely agreeing.
Another example from EU Profiler is item 26: ‘The European Parliament
should be given more powers’. What kind of powers this statement refers to?
Are they policy-making powers, or just some ‘oversight of the work of the EU’,
the statement that was used to code the Green Party of England and Wales as
‘completely agree’. Does arguing that policy making should be transferred
from the national parliaments to the European Parliament be equated with the
aforementioned statement of the Green Party? And how do we deal with
parties that are for transferring some policy-making powers (say environmental
policy) but against transferring others?
Experts coders involved in VAAs are essentially asked to content analyse
statements on the basis of their expertise and (sometimes) the specific instruc-
tions of a codebook. In the context of content analysis, coding reliability is
usually measured by the degree of agreement among coders working indepen-
dent of one another. Put otherwise, we can infer coding reliability by measuring
coder agreement (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 414). Considering the problems
outlined above, it is easy to expect that different coders will come up with
different positions for the same political actors, therefore rendering the VAA
approach to position political parties as unreliable. To date, however, most
VAAs have not addressed the possibility of coding unreliability stemming from
variability in document sources or the ambiguity of stem statements in a
systematic way. As far as I know, VAAs do not routinely report intercoder
reliability. EU Profiler, for instance, relies on ‘discussions among team members’
and consultations with experts and the VAA leadership (Trechsel and Mair,
2011). However, making decisions by consensus among the VAA team
members does not guarantee coding reliability. As Krippendorff (2004, p. 217)
warned, ‘in groups like these, observers are known to negotiate and to yield to
each other in tit-for-tat exchanges, with prestigious group members dominating
the outcome [y] and coding comes to reect the social structure of the group’.
In this article, I present a first attempt to examine the intercoder reliability in
the Likert items used by VAAs to position political parties. To do so, I use data
from a coding exercise conducted at the University of Twente where 80
European Studies undergraduate students attending a course on conceptua-
lisation and measurement agreed to participate after being offered partial
Parties’ positions in VAAs
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course credit. The students were assigned to German (n¼ 41) and Dutch
(n¼ 39) language groups on the basis of their native or uency of language, and
were asked to code the Dutch and German parties on 16 selected EU Profiler
statements using their 2009 EP election manifestos. The details of the exercise
are presented in the online supplementary material of this article. In summary,
the results in terms of Krippendorff’s alpha, the statistic that is generally
agreed to be the ‘measure with appropriate reliability interpretations in content
analysis’ (Krippendorff, 2004, p. 221), were found to be unacceptably low for
each of the 16 statements for the coding to be considered reliable even for
drawing tentative conclusions. Nevertheless, because the placement of parties
was not the result of a content analysis according to some specified coding unit
(which is the focus of Krippendorff’s alpha) but rather latent coding of party
positions, I also assessed coding reliability using van der Eijk’s (2001) coeffi-
cient of agreement, which has been devised to measure respondent agreement
on ordinal rating scales. The latter assessment showed a more mixed picture of
some of the statements scoring A40.7 on the agreement coefficient across
parties. As expected, ambiguous statements such as ‘the European Parliament
should be given more powers’, in which conflicting evidence can be taken into
account, scored much lower in terms of coding reliability than specific
statements such as the one referring to possibility of Turkey becoming a full
member-state. In addition, statements referring to environmental policies fared
generally worse than statements referring to European integration. This implies
that coding reliability is also constrained by the type of documents used (cf.
Gemenis, 2012). When lacking credible documents that explicitly refer to the
statements used by VAAs, coders are in a much worse position in estimating
the positions of parties.
The results presented here do not imply that the data of the EU Profiler are
unreliable. The coding exercise did not attempt to replicate the precise
conditions in which the EU Profiler coding took place. As mentioned above,
the EU Profiler researchers do not work independently to one another, which
means that the reliability of their coding work cannot be estimated; thus, the
presented results should be seen as measures of the potential reliability for cod-
ing party positions by using Likert items. Designers of VAAs should be vigilant
about the possibility that the estimation procedure might have low intercoder
reliability, which in turn may compromise the validity (Krippendorff, 2004,
p. 214) of party placements.
Scaling Issues
One of the features that arguably makes VAAs so popular is their ability to
give voting recommendations on the basis of graphical representations of the
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congruence between voters and parties (or candidates). The Kieskompas family
of VAAs, which includes the EU Profiler, routinely uses a two-dimensional
space to present the positions of candidates and parties, whereas VAAs in the
Smartvote family use radar (spider) charts that are able to represent positions
in multiple policy dimensions. Even VAAs that do not provide graphical
representations of the agreement between voters and parties often adopt spatial
models for their voting recommendation calculations (Louwerse and Rosema,
2011, p. 2).
A crucial aspect of placing political actors on political space relates to the
dimensionality of political space. Broadly speaking, political scientists have a
choice between adopting a deductive and an inductive approach in defining
dimensionality (Benoit and Laver, 2012). The purely deductive approach
involves defining a priori the most important dimensions and then placing the
actors on these dimensions. Expert surveys follow this deductive approach.
The inductive approach involves selecting a number of items and using a
scaling method to arrange the items in policy or ideological dimensions. The
problem with the inductive approach, however, is that it is only quasi-inductive
in the sense that the results depend largely on the quantity and type of issues
that are used in the calculations (Benoit and Laver, 2012, pp. 207–208). This
brings us back to the problem of item selection, a deductive exercise with
important consequences for party placement. In a seminal methodological
article, Walgrave et al (2009) demonstrated how the selection of different sets
of statements (that is, Likert items) in VAAs can lead not only to different
estimates of the positions of parties, but also to different levels of best matches
among voters. The latter finding implies that, in some instances, some parties
may find themselves in the beneficial position of receiving more voting
recommendations because of artefacts in the VAA construction. Taking the
EU Profiler as an illustrative case, the remainder of this section examines the
reliability and validity of the scales used by VAAs to position parties.
EU Profiler has adopted the deductive approach of the Kieskompas. In
particular, EU Profiler places parties on a two-dimensional political space, on
the basis of previous literature that defined the EU polity as a two-dimensional
political space based on socio-economic left–right (L–R) dimension and a pro/
anti-EU integration (EU) dimension, which are orthogonal to one another
(Hooghe et al, 2002; Hix et al, 2006). Each dimension includes a number of
issues that have been identified (through consultations with experts and by look-
ing at party manifestos) as being salient during the 2009 EP election campaign.
Given that different items are ‘fitted’ into scales based on prior expectations
about issue salience and their a priori fit, it would be interesting to examine the
reliability and validity of the constructed EU Profiler scales.
Unfortunately, many VAA websites do not give precise details regarding
which items are included in each scale. The EU Profiler is no exception as the
Parties’ positions in VAAs
13r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica 1–28
detailed ‘General Description and Methodology’ document does not look at
scale construction, although I was able to obtain the relevant information by
contacting a member of the EU Profiler team. By using the provided infor-
mation, I was able to fully replicate parties’ scores on the EU scale, that is, the
scores given in the EU Profiler data set (Trechsel, 2010), but I was unable to do
so for the L–R scale. As party scores in my reconstruction of the L–R scale
correlate highly with the scores in the original data set (0.961), save a single
outlier and no bias is detected, I proceed into analysis with this small caveat in
mind.
As researchers are often confronted with stationary measurement, assessing
scale reliability is often associated with the split-half method, where a scale
consisting of half of the original scale items is compared with the scale con-
sisting of the other half. In this sense, the typical statistic used to assess the
reliability of a Likert scale is Cronbach’s alpha, which, as the original article
showcased (Cronbach, 1951, p. 300), provides the ‘average of all possible split-
half coefficients’ in a scale. Cronbach’s alpha for the EU and L–R scales is
0.925 and 0.878, respectively, two values that indicate that the scales are
reliable in terms of split-half reliability. Although the high Cronbach’s alpha
indicates a high split-half reliability, it is not a measure of internal consistency,
homogeneity or unidimensionality of a scale (Sijtsma, 2009). In other words,
a high alpha does not necessarily indicate that the items of the scale belong in
the same dimension or that they are measuring attributes of a common latent
variable (the latter refers to measurement validity). Assessing whether the items
fit within a given scale has seen the development in many indices based on
answer patterns, factor analysis, principal components or latent trait models
(Hattie, 1985, pp. 141–142). Recognising that different methods might lead to
different (and sometimes conicting) results, I first assess scale validity using an
informal visualisation approach and then switch to inductive approaches
(factor analysis and Mokken scaling). In addition, I validate the EU Profiler
party scores against expert survey data.
The first approach looks at internal association by fitting a locally adjusted
regression curve on scatter plots between each item and a scale consisting of all
other items (Dinas and Gemenis, 2010; Gemenis and Dinas, 2010). I follow this
approach because a central assumption of the Likert scale is that, every item in
the scale is monotonically related to the underlying latent dimension (Jacoby,
1991, p. 40). This implies that the scores of an item that fit well into a scale
should increase as the scores in the latent dimension increase and vice versa. In
this case, the scores in the latent dimension are proxied by the values of the
scale consisting of all other items. Nevertheless, because item-rest correlations
measure linear relationships, while we are merely interested in monotonic
relationships, I evaluate monotone homogeneity by using locally adjusted
regression (loess) curves instead of item-rest correlations.
Gemenis
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The scatter plots in Figure 1 show that every item in the EU scale is mono-
tonically related to the respective rest scores, which imply a good item-scale fit.
The situation is quite different for the L–R scale, however Figure 2 of the 18
items included in the scale, there are at least two items that do not seem to fit in
the scale. Item 4 (‘Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers
should be encouraged as a means of fostering economic growth’) appears to
have a relationship with the latent L–R dimension, which is clearly not
monotonic. This possibly stems from the double-barrelled nature of the stem
statement, which, as argued in Section ‘Stem statement and response key
issues’, is particularly problematic as the two different issues introduced into
the statement (immigration and economic growth) do not seem to have a clear
trade-off relation to each other. The same goes for item 15, which refers to
reducing the EU subsidies to Europe’s farmers. This item refers to EU policy
and does not sit comfortably in the L–R scale. In addition, items 8, 17 and 19
seem somewhat problematic, although the change in direction of the loess
curves might be because of observations in specific countries, which would
imply problems in cross-country comparability of the content and meaning of
the L–R scale.
Seeing some problems in the construction of the L–R scale, I switch to a
quasi-inductive examination of the EU Profiler items. I first do so by using
exploratory factor analysis. As the individual items of a Likert scale ‘are
ordinal-level functions of the latent dimension’ (Jacoby, 1991, p. 40), our factor
analysis is based on a polychoric correlations matrix to account for the ordinal
level measurement of the items. To avoid the problem of reducing the number
of observations because of list wise deletion, I replace missing values by the
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Figure 1: Examining the scalability of the items in the EU Profiler EU scale (loess bandwidth¼
0.7; points jittered 5 per cent).
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issues’, this is a controversial practice, but is in line with the EU Profiler
practice where missing values are treated as neutral categories for computa-
tional reasons.
The results in Table 3 suggest that the political space for the 2009 EP
elections can be best represented by four dimensions (corresponding to four
factors with eigenvalues 41). All the items loading strongly on the first factor
refer to the pro/anti-EU dimension. In fact, all the items of the EU Profiler EU
scale load highly on the first factor, in addition to item 28 referring to the need
for referendums in approving EU treaties. Turning to the remaining factors, it
appears that the EU Profiler L–R scale is not unidimensional as previously
assumed. Issues pertaining to ‘authoritarian versus libertarian’ and ‘taxes
versus spending’ sub-dimensions of the L–R appear to have high loadings on
the second and the third factors, respectively. The three environmental items
together with one item about immigration load mostly on the fourth factor.
Nonetheless, even one disregards the evidence in favour of a multidimensional
measurement of the L–R, the factor analysis results confirmed the previous
assessment that issues 4 and 15 should not have been included in the L–R scale.
Finally, the item with the largest uniqueness in the data set is item 13, which
refers to bank bailouts by governments. This reveals that it does not fit
comfortably within any of the extracted factors, which makes sense given that
the issue of bank bailouts entered the political agenda only very recently.
Furthermore, I considered that different items in the scale many represent
different difficulty factors. For instance, a party may generally agree that
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Figure 2: Examining the scalability of the items in the EU Profiler L–R scale (loess
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should acquire its own tax-raising powers’ (item 12). However, the reverse is
rather unlikely. If a party would agree on the most difficult item (‘tax raising
powers’), it would be unlikely to disagree on the easy item (that European
integration is generally desirable). To examine unidimensionality within this
context, I use Mokken scale analysis (van Schuur, 2003), which is based on the
idea of the Guttman scale but looks at the difficulty ordering of items in
probabilistic terms. The selection of items into a scale in Mokken scale analysis
is determined by Loevinger’s coefficient of homogeneity h under a null
hypothesis test ‘that all item pairs are stochastically independent of one
Table 3: Factor analysis of the EU Profiler items
Item Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Uniqueness
1 0.142 0.218 0.755 0.184 0.329
2 0.128 0.175 0.775 0.041 0.351
3 0.076 0.134 0.540 0.112 0.673
4 0.414 0.100 0.357 0.384 0.544
5 0.113 0.466 0.121 0.668 0.310
6 0.058 0.458 0.241 0.477 0.501
7 0.135 0.848 0.102 0.298 0.163
8 0.071 0.706 0.136 0.119 0.463
9 0.057 0.749 0.226 0.029 0.385
10 0.147 0.791 0.123 0.017 0.338
11 0.105 0.278 0.684 0.158 0.418
12 0.577 0.240 0.286 0.076 0.522
13 0.455 0.077 0.066 0.079 0.776
14 0.138 0.154 0.742 0.239 0.349
15 0.185 0.325 0.436 0.176 0.639
16 0.164 0.137 0.427 0.511 0.512
17 0.170 0.136 0.297 0.585 0.523
18 0.075 0.132 0.454 0.569 0.447
19 0.026 0.515 0.268 0.427 0.480
20 0.078 0.549 0.306 0.426 0.418
21 0.902 0.064 0.038 0.009 0.181
22 0.834 0.207 0.140 0.085 0.235
23 0.906 0.048 0.049 0.080 0.168
24 0.888 0.019 0.139 0.091 0.183
25 0.392 0.273 0.046 0.433 0.583
26 0.729 0.263 0.209 0.058 0.352
27 0.812 0.227 0.016 0.119 0.275
28 0.588 0.201 0.277 0.225 0.487
% of variance explained 30.4 21.7 20.4 14.1 Total
86.6
Note: Analysis based on polychoric correlations matrix; varimax rotation; highlighted cells indicate
loadings greater than 0.5.
Parties’ positions in VAAs
17r 2012 Macmillan Publishers Ltd. 0001-6810 Acta Politica 1–28
another’ (van Schuur, 2003, p. 149). As a rule of thumb, the scales with h40.3
are considered acceptable, although strong scales should attain h40.5. As
ordering in terms of difficulty implies that items are in the same direction, I
recoded all items so that positive values would always reflect a right-wing or
pro-EU position. I then performed a Mokken scale analysis by setting the
threshold for item selection at 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5, which correspond to weak,
moderate and strong scales, respectively.
The results in Table 4 largely confirm the results of the factor analysis. When
the threshold for selecting pairs of items was set at h40.5, the Mokken scaling
procedure resulted in five strong scales. The first scale includes all the items of
the EU Profiler EU scale, the second includes three items on the ‘taxes versus
Table 4: Mokken scale analysis of the EU Profiler items
Item Item selection with
h40.5 h40.4 h40.3
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3
1* — 0.64 — — — — 0.59 — — — — 0.50 —
2 — — — — — — 0.48 — — — — 0.40 —
3* — — — — — — — — — — — — —
4* — — — — — — — — — — — — —
5 — — — 0.61 — — — — 0.54 — — — 0.44
6 — — — 0.56 — — — — 0.57 — — — 0.41
7* — — 0.57 — — — — 0.54 — — — — 0.48
8 — — 0.63 — — — — 0.54 — — — — 0.43
9* — — 0.58 — — — — 0.54 — — — — 0.45
10* — — 0.58 — — — — 0.52 — — — — 0.42
11 — 0.59 — — — — 0.56 — — — — 0.50 —
12 0.61 — — — — 0.52 — — — — 0.48 — —
13 — 0.51 — — — — 0.49 — — — 0.32 — —
14 — — — — — — — — — — — 0.43 —
15* — — — — — — — — — — — — —
16* — — — — 0.55 — — — 0.41 — — 0.35 —
17* — — — — — — — — — 0.51 — — —
18* — — — — 0.55 — — — — 0.51 — 0.34 —
19 — — — — — — — 0.42 — — — — 0.38
20 — — — 0.54 — — — 0.43 — — — — 0.46
21 0.70 — — — — 0.68 — — — — 0.64 — —
22 0.59 — — — — 0.58 — — — — 0.55 — —
23 0.69 — — — — 0.68 — — — — 0.64 — —
24 0.67 — — — — 0.68 — — — — 0.65 — —
25* — — — — — — — — 0.49 — — — 0.36
26 0.53 — — — — 0.50 — — — — 0.48 — —
27 0.68 — — — — 0.62 — — — — 0.58 — —
28* — — — — — 0.40 — — — — 0.39 — —
Scale h 0.64 0.58 0.59 0.57 0.55 0.59 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.54 0.43 0.43
Note: Items with * are reversed.
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spending’ dimension, the third includes all four items of the ‘society, religion
and culture’ EU Profiler spider graph, the fourth includes three items about
law and order and immigration and the fifth comprises two out of the three
environmental policy items. By relaxing the threshold to h40.4, an additional
item is included in each of the first two scales, without changing their
interpretation. Moreover, two law and order items are added on the third scale
effectively making it a ‘authoritarian versus libertarian’ scale, whereasile the
fourth scale becomes more of a mixed bag. Finally, relaxing the threshold to
h40.3 results in three scales: a slightly expanded EU scale with the addition of
the rather irrelevant item on bank bailouts (which nevertheless has the lowest h
coefficient in the scale) and two scales corresponding to the ‘authoritarian
versus libertarian’ and ‘taxes versus spending’ sub-dimensions of the L–R.
Finally, in none of the scaling procedures did items 3, 4 and 15 attain the
minimum acceptable value of 0.3 on the h coefficient, which attests to their
limited scalability, largely confirming the results obtained by factor analysis
and the inspection of item-rest score scatter plots.
The final step in examining the EU Profiler scales involves validation against
alternative measures. To do so, I compare the EU Profiler placements on the
EU and L–R scales with the placements given by the 2006 Chapel Hill expert
survey (Hooghe et al, 2010). As the Pearson product–moment correlation
coefficient reflects dispersion rather than agreement between two measures,
I use the concordance correlation coefficient rc (Lin, 1989). The advantage of
using rc in assessing agreement between two methods of estimating parties’
policy positions (Gemenis, 2012, p. 601). In essence, the concordance correla-
tion coefficient is the product of two components: Pearson’s r, which measures
accuracy, and the bias correction factor Cb, which measures precision.
Table 5 presents the results of these comparisons. The results point out that
the EU Profiler scales have a fairly good concordance with the respective
expert survey scales when we consider that we should not expect a near perfect
concordance between the two measures, given that the 2006 Chapel Hill expert
survey was conducted nearly 3 years before the 2009 EP election, and that its
EU scale measures party leader positions instead of party positions. A look at
the components of the concordance correlation coefficient reveals that the
Table 5: Comparing the EU Profiler and expert survey party placements
Scale N rc 95% CI r Cb
EU Profiler pro/anti-EU 143 0.826 [0.767, 0.872] 0.833 0.992
EU Profiler L-R 143 0.785 [0.720, 0.837] 0.842 0.933
Modified L-R 142 0.835 [0.780, 0.878] 0.859 0.972
Note: rc: concordance correlation coefficient; 95% CI: z-transform 95% confidence interval;
r: Pearson product–moment correlation coefficient; Cb: bias correction factor.
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disagreement between EU Profiler and expert survey placements are mostly
because of random measurement error. This is mostly true for the EU scale
rather than the L–R, which has a lower Cb indicating some bias. Moreover,
Figure 3 shows that this bias is not distributed evenly across the L–R scale. The
slope of the reduced major axis on the middle scatter plot in Figure 3 indicates
that extreme right parties (as placed by the experts) are more likely to be placed
towards the centre by the EU Profiler compared with extreme left parties.
Could the EU Profiler L–R scale be improved in light of the analyses
presented in this section? The last line in Table 5 and the right scatter plot in
Figure 3 evaluate an alternative L–R scale on the basis of the EU Profiler data.
Notwithstanding the evidence in favour of a multidimensional interpretation of
the L–R scale given by the factor analysis and Mokken scale analysis, the
modified L–R simply drops the items that were shown to be problematic in
Figure 2 (items 3, 4, 8, 15 and 17). The results in Table 5 and Figure 3 point out
that the modified scale reduces the centrist bias on the extreme right of the
scale and results in greater concordance with expert surveys, although the
overlapping confidence intervals indicate that this increase is not large enough
to be statistically significant. However, the argument put forward by the
analyses in this section is that the placement of political parties by VAAs can
be improved by quasi-inductive techniques, reliability analysis and rigorous
validation of the used scaling methods.
Conclusions
This article used examples primarily from EU Profiler to highlight some
methodological issues faced by VAAs in estimating the positions of political
parties. I argue that third-party users of VAA data should acknowledge these
issues, although this article does not imply that VAAs are inherently
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exhibit a lot of potential for creating data that could enable us to answer many
important empirical questions in comparative politics. For instance, this article
showed that despite all the aforementioned methodological concerns, when
compared with the 2006 Chapel Hill expert survey, the EU Profiler party
placements appear to be more valid in comparison with the placements derived
from the Euromanifestos Project (cf. Veen, 2011, p. 280). Moreover, most of
the issues identified in this article can be dealt with in a fairly straightforward
manner. For this reason, the article concludes with a set of recommendations
for VAA designers.
Regarding the phrasing of stem statements, VAA designers could avoid
using double-barrelled and quantitative statements, as well as statements that
are too general. As shown in the article, sometimes double-barrelled statements
arise from the (legitimate) need to present fiscal attitudes as a trade-off between
conflicting choices, but in other instances they should be avoided. In addition,
giving responses on Likert item response keys on quantitative statements
requires increased cognitive efforts, which may lead to satisficing (Krosnick,
1991), whereas vague statements may lead to coding unreliability. In terms of
designing response scales, VAA designers could consider avoiding offering a
midpoint for controversial questions, but consider offering a reference point
that indicates the status quo. More generally, the findings from the survey
design literature can be used to achieve best practice in the area of statement
phrasing and response scale formulation.
Turning to the issue of coding statements into response scales, VAA
designers can be more explicit in reporting coding reliability. This would
require switching from the current practice of coding by ‘consensus’ to a coding
procedure involving two rounds. In the first round, multiple coders would
work on the same parties and statements independent of one another, and in
the second round any inconsistencies among the coders could be solved by con-
sensus. This two-round coding process would not only enable the calculation of
meaningful intercoder reliability statistics, but also it would make ‘reasonable to
assume that post-coding reconciliation improves the reliability of the data
beyond the reliability of data generated by any one individual observer’
(Krippendorff, 2004, p. 219). In addition, VAAs, which make use of parties’ self-
placements, could be more explicit about reporting the concordance between
party self-placement and placement by the VAA research team. This way, we can
have a measure of the degree to which parties may be trying to manipulate their
placement in VAAs in order to achieve more voting recommendations. Coding
reliability also relates to transparency and the need for research to be replicable.
VAAs could make worthy investments by producing detailed coding handbooks,
which can be made available publicly in their websites. In this respect, EU
Profiler is a best practice example as it allows users to see the exact statements
(and their source) that have been used to code each party position.
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Finally, with regard to the assumptions about the dimensionality of political
space and scale validity and reliability, VAA designers can combine a priori
deductive reasoning with quasi-inductive statistical techniques as outlined in
this article. More specifically, VAA designers can implement the informal (but
informative) graphical approach outlined in the previous section in order to
check how well individual items fit into the scales utilised by VAAs. Moreover,
quasi-inductive techniques such as factor analysis and Mokken scale analysis can
be used to improve the validity and reliability of the resulting scales (see also
Groot, 2003, pp. 26–28). Since different scaling methods may lead to different
voting recommendations (Louwerse and Rosema, 2011), it is advisable to follow
some of best practices outlined in the dimensionality and scaling literature.
Although VAAs are used by an increasing number of countries and in an
increasing number of electoral contexts, the methodological discussions about
regarding their use has been rather limited. I hope that this article will open
a wider debate on how VAAs can estimate the positions of political actors in
a valid and reliable way, and that VAA designers might consider some of the
recommendations proposed here. Following methodological practices such as
the ones outlined in this article in phrasing stem statements, constructing
response keys, presenting coding decisions, reporting intercoder reliability,
dealing with missing values and assessing scale validity and reliability will
increase confidence in the use of VAAs, both from the perspective of the public
and the perspective of third-party users of VAA data.
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Appendix A
Table A1: Examples of double-barrelled or quantitative statements in recent European VAAs
VAA Country Year Statement
Wahlkabine Austria 2008 Should the names of sex offenders in
Austria be recorded on a special
register and made public?
Wahlkabine Austria 2008 Should the video surveillance of public
spaces (eg., spaces, public buildings
and transport, and so on) be further
increased in Austria?
Help Me Vote Greece 2010 The electoral system must be changed
and single-member constituencies
should be established in order to
strengthen the relationship between
citizens and MPs and eliminate the
need for campaign spending.
Help Me Vote Greece 2010 The police should use more strict
repressive measures to protect the
property of citizens.
Vote Match UK 2010 The Government should be compelled
by law to halve the budget deficit
within 4 years.
Vote Match UK 2010 All Government departments should
face some of the spending cuts
necessary to reduce the budget
deficit.
StemWijzer The Netherlands 2010 People who become unemployed
receive unemployment benefits. The
amount they receive in the first few
months needs to be increased, but
the total period of the benefits has to
be much shorter.
StemWijzer The Netherlands 2010 Car ownership has to become cheaper
and the use of the car more
expensive. Therefore there needs to
be a kilometre levy.
StemWijzer The Netherlands 2010 There should be stricter punishment
for people who use violence.
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Appendix B
Items in the EU Profiler
1. Social programmes should be maintained even at the cost of higher taxes.
2. Greater efforts should be made to privatise health-care services in the
[country].
3. State subsidies for cre´ches and child care should be increased substantially.
4. Immigration policies oriented towards skilled workers should be encour-
aged as a means of fostering economic growth.
5. Immigration into the [country] should be made more restrictive.
6. Immigrants from outside Europe should be required to accept our culture
and values.
7. The legalisation of same sex marriages is a good thing.
8. Religious values and principles should be shown greater respect in politics.
9. The decriminalisation of the personal use of soft drugs is to be welcomed
10. Euthanasia should be legalised.
11. Government spending should be reduced in order to lower taxes.
12. The EU should acquire its own tax-raising powers.
13. Governments should bail out failing banks with public money.
14. Governments should reduce workers’ protection regulations in order to
fight unemployment.
15. The EU should drastically reduce its subsidies to Europe’s farmers.
Table A1 continued
VAA Country Year Statement
Smartvote Switzerland 2011 Should Switzerland legalize the
consumption of hard and soft drugs
as well as the possession of such
drugs for personal consumption?
Smartvote Switzerland 2011 Should access to ‘facilitated
naturalization’ via the Federation be
made more difficult?
Smartvote Switzerland 2011 Would you essentially welcome greater
restriction on the tax competition
that applies between the cantons?
Note: The elements of double-barrelled statements are underlined; quantitative elements are
marked in italics.
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16. Renewable sources of energy (for example, solar or wind energy) should be
supported even if this means higher energy costs.
17. The promotion of public transport should be fostered through green taxes
(for example, road taxing).
18. Policies to fight global warming should be encouraged even if it hampers
economic growth or employment.
19. Restrictions of civil liberties should be accepted in the fight against
terrorism.
20. Criminals should be punished more severely.
21. On foreign policy issues, such as the relationship with Russia, the EU
should speak with one voice.
22. The European Union should strengthen its security and defence policy.
23. European integration is a good thing.
24. [Country] is much better off in the EU than outside it.
25. The European Union should be enlarged to include Turkey.
26. The European Parliament should be given more powers.
27. Individual member states of the EU should have less veto power.
28. Any new European Treaty should be subject to approval in a referendum
in the [country].
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